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PolicyTendering procedures for concession of port terminals to private operators have been the subject of considerable
interest during the last decade. As a consequence, keys to effective port governance, particularly the landlord
model, are fairly well understood, even standardised to some degree. By contrast, intermodal terminal contracts
have been found to be quite varied, with little standardisation of procedures, requirements, risks, incentives or
contracts even within a single country.
This paper applies lessons from the study of port terminal concession contracts to the intermodal sector. The
World Bank port reform toolkit is used to create a framework with 72 provisions, which is then matched against
ﬁve intermodal terminal concession contracts. The analysis reveals several uncertainties in intermodal conces-
sion contracts, relating particularly to a lack of speciﬁed provisions on performance monitoring and measure-
ment, open access to users, infrastructure maintenance, service marketing and hand back procedures. The
paper identiﬁes how the port concession framework used in this paper can be adapted for use with intermodal
terminals, as the ﬁrst step towards developing a global standard such as that used in the port sector.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
Port governance has been treated comprehensively in the literature.
As major engines for driving economies, control of ports is a signiﬁcant
lever for governments to manage trade and its resultant economic ben-
eﬁts. Over recent decades, a general trend has been observed for port
management to move from the public to the private sector (Baird,
2002). Tendering procedures for concession of port terminals to private
operators have been the subject of considerable interest during the last
decade (see Section 3). As a consequence, keys to effective port gover-
nance, particularly the landlord model, are fairly well understood, if
not even standardised to some degree.
Intermodal terminals are, though generally smaller than ports,
similarly important to trade ﬂows, of strategic importance to countries,
regions and municipalities (Ng & Gujar, 2009). Moreover, the use of in-
termodal transport to reduce emissions by taking a larger modal share
of overland transport from road haulage is a key aspect of government
emissions reduction targets (EuropeanCommission, 2001). Efﬁcient op-
eration of intermodal terminals and corridors is essential to reach these
goals, but is constrained by various factors (see Section 2). Topics such
as terminal design and rail/barge operations have been addressed in
the literature, but “soft” factors such as ineffectivemanagementhave re-
ceived far less attention (Monios, 2014). In contrast to port concessions,ickard.bergqvist@handels.gu.se
. This is an open access article underintermodal terminal management models are quite varied, with little
standardisation of procedures, requirements, risks or incentives even
within a single country (Bergqvist & Monios, forthcoming).
This paper focuses on the concession arrangement between public
sector owner and private sector operator. The methodology is to apply
lessons from the study of port terminal tendering procedures to the in-
termodal sector. The World Bank port reform toolkit is used to create a
conceptual framework, which is then matched against a selection of in-
termodal terminal concession contracts. The analysis reveals where po-
tential weaknesses and uncertainties in intermodal tendering processes
can beneﬁt from clear lessons from similar processes in the maritime
sector. The goal is to provide theﬁrst step towards standardisation of in-
termodal terminal concessioning procedures.
The empirical research is based on a selection of case studies of inter-
modal terminal concessions in Sweden, according to the rationale that it
was one of the earliest countries in Europe to liberalise its rail freight
network and vertically separate infrastructure and services. Thus Swed-
ish intermodal terminals are, like ports, often developed and owned by
the public sector and leased on contacts to private operators. The ten-
dering procedure by which these relationships are formalised provides
a source of data analogous to the situation in ports and thus suitable
for the research framework developed in this paper. While the geo-
graphical scope of the empirical data is limited to one country, the
goal of the paper is to use these data to adapt the current port conces-
sion framework for use in the intermodal sector. Once the framework
has been developed in this paper, future research can apply the ﬁndings
in other contexts in order to reﬁne the framework further.the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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ment and operation to reveal the lack of research on the relationship be-
tween the intermodal terminal owner and operator and the potentially
adverse impact on effective operations. Section 3 reviews the literature
on port concessions to draw lessons for the intermodal sector, while
Section 4 utilises the concession framework in the World Bank Port
Reform Toolkit to derive a suitable framework applicable to intermodal
terminals. Sections 5 and 6 outline the case study methodology and the
background to the Swedish case, before the results of applying the frame-
work are presented in Section 7. Section 8 presents conclusions andpolicy
recommendations, in addition to suggestions for future research.2. Intermodal terminal management and operations
The literature on intermodal terminals has addressed a number of
key issues in recent years. The development phase, in particular, has re-
ceived signiﬁcant attention (e.g. Beresford, Pettit, Xu, &Williams, 2012;
Bergqvist, Falkemark, & Woxenius, 2010; Flämig & Hesse, 2011;
Hanaoka & Regmi, 2011; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2012; Ng & Gujar,
2009; Rodrigue, Debrie, Fremont, & Gouvernal, 2010; Roso, 2008;
Wilmsmeier, Monios, & Lambert, 2011). The economic feasibility of in-
termodal operations, both in the terminal and along the corridor, has
been an important topic for quantitative analysis (e.g. Arnold, Peeters,
& Thomas, 2004; Ballis & Golias, 2002; Iannone, 2012; Janic, 2007;
Kim & Wee, 2011; Kreutzberger, 2008), while qualitative approaches
have sought to understand the importance of aligning cargo types
with intermodal service characteristics (e.g. Eng-Larsson & Kohn,
2012; Monios, 2013; Slack & Vogt, 2007; Van der Horst & De Langen,
2008; Woodburn, 2003; Woodburn, 2011) as well as the role of trans-
port industry actors in choosing intermodal transport rather than road
haulage (e.g. Bärthel & Woxenius, 2004; Panayides, 2002; Runhaar &
van der Heijden, 2005; Van Schijndel & Dinwoodie, 2000).
These papers reveal the importance of understanding the roles
played by key actors in the public and private sectors, especially con-
sidering the fact that many intermodal terminals are owned by the
public sector but managed on a concession basis by private sector
operators. Little research has investigated these relationships and
whether they have an adverse impact on effective operations; this
is an interesting lacuna, given that questions have been raised re-
garding the efﬁcacy of public investment in terminals that experi-
ence difﬁculty achieving economic viability (Gouvernal, Debrie, &
Slack, 2005; Höltgen, 1996; Liedtke & Carillo Murillo, 2012; Proost
et al., 2011).
A topic that has received only limited attention is the management
model in intermodal transport (Lehtinan & Bask, 2012). Beresford
et al. (2012) applied theWorld Bank port classiﬁcation (public, private,
tool, landlord) to dry ports, and Monios (2013, 2014) developed this
classiﬁcation further, using governance theory to explore how the dif-
ferent types of organisations that may own and/or operate a terminal
can affect these relationships, for examplewhether the terminal is oper-
ated by a dedicated terminal operator, a rail service operator, or other
sectors such as a 3PL or even a subsidiary of a port terminal operator.
An area identiﬁed for future research was the relationships between
owner, operator and user and how these inﬂuence the management
of resources in the pursuit of efﬁcient and effective operation of
intermodal terminals. As a consequence, Bergqvist & Monios
(forthcoming) explored the relationship between infrastructure
owners, terminal owners, terminal operators and rail operators, ﬁnd-
ing that the contractual procedures are quite varied, with little
standardisation of procedures, requirements, risks or incentives even
within a single country. They concluded that greater standardisation is
required to alleviate these uncertainties, but as yet no framework
has been developed to address this need. It is the contention of this
paper that such a framework may be found in the literature on port
concessions.3. Port concessions
A large body of literature exists on different models of port gover-
nance, a close examination of which is beyond the scope of this paper
(e.g. Baird, 2000, 2002; Baltazar & Brooks, 2001; Brooks, 2004; Brooks
& Cullinane, 2007; Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Cullinane & Song, 2002;
Everett & Robinson, 1998; Ferrari & Musso, 2011; Hoffmann, 2001;
Notteboom, De Langen, & Wouter, 2013; Pallis & Syriopoulos, 2007;
Verhoeven & Vanoutrive, 2012). The World Bank (2001, 2007) identi-
ﬁed four models: the public service port, the private port, the tool port
(amixedmodelwhere private sector operators perform some of the op-
erations but under the direction of public sector managers) and the
landlord port (the public sector retains ownership while the terminal
management and operations are leased to private sector operators).
In many cases a handover of a public port terminal to a private oper-
ator is not a one-off action but an ongoing process of governance reform,
leading to numerous parallels with the governance of intermodal termi-
nals. For example, the inﬂuence of shipping networks on port terminal
management (Wilmsmeier & Notteboom, 2011) is reﬂected in the
need for intermodal terminals to attract and maintain trafﬁc (Bergqvist
et al., 2010), as the terminal owner and operator strive to embed the ter-
minal in the larger ﬂows of trafﬁc governed by decision makers such as
shippers, rail operators and 3PLs. The role of the port authority in the
cluster of associated businesses and services agglomerated around a
port (Bichou & Gray, 2005; De Langen, 2004; Hall, 2003; Hall & Jacobs,
2010) is mirrored in the increasing focus of planners to integrate inter-
modal terminals with logistics platforms and freight villages (Monios,
in press). The devolution of port governance from one level of govern-
ment to another rather than from the public to the private sector
(Debrie, Gouvernal, & Slack, 2007) can also be relevant because, in
cases where the terminal is owned by a government, which level of gov-
ernment retains planning or funding powers can have a determinative
impact on the responsiveness of the terminal contract (e.g. fees, access
conditions) to changes in the industry, themarket or thewider economy.
Advantages of greater private sector involvement in ports include in-
creased efﬁciency and reduced cost to the public sector, while negative
impacts include the loss or increased ambiguity of state control as well
as the difﬁculties and risks involved inmanaging the tender process and
subsequent monitoring (Baird, 2002). However, despite something of a
standardisation of approach, applying this generic process to ports in
different regions has produced a diversiﬁcation of outcomes, varying ac-
cording to local conditions (e.g. Baird, 2002; Ng & Pallis, 2010; Wang &
Slack, 2004; Wang, Ng, & Olivier, 2004). Therefore, while a standard
template is no guarantee of a standardised result in every case, such a
template facilitates analysis of the process and the outcomes and com-
parison between cases.
4. Deriving a conceptual framework
The Port Reform Toolkit was ﬁrst published by the World Bank in
2001 and updated in 2007. One of its stated aims is to provide support
to public sector ofﬁcials in “choosing among options for private sector
participation and analyzing their implications for redeﬁning interde-
pendent operational, regulatory, and legal relationships between public
and private parties” (p. xviii). It consists of eight modules. Module 4
(legal tools for port reform) contains advice on various legal instru-
ments, including the preparation of concession agreements.
The World Bank toolkit provides a list of 72 provisions normally
found in a concession or BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) agreement.
These cover the basic conditions and project scope, the hand over and
hand back procedures, project ﬁnance and legal issues, extension
works, operations, fee setting and performance monitoring. The World
Bankmodel covers concession of existing terminals as well as the build-
ing of new ones (or extending current terminals).
The empirical analysis in this paper will examine all the 72 provi-
sions in the World Bank model as the ﬁrst step in systematising what
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from there to work towards a customised model. It is expected that
some categories will not be applicable, due to the different operational
requirements between ports and intermodal terminals, as well as the
reduced complexity and trafﬁc of the latter.
5. Methodology
The methodology is based on a selection of case studies from
Sweden. The choice of a case study research approach was based on
the ambition to analyse the dynamics of the phenomenon from
a ‘why’ and ‘how’ perspective (Hilmola, Hejazi, & Ojala, 2005;
Silverman, 2001; Yin, 1994). Case studies are particularly useful for ex-
ploratory research. The geographical focus on Sweden is based on the
rationale that it is one of the earliest countries in Europe to liberalise
its rail freight networks and vertically separate infrastructure and
services. Thus Swedish intermodal terminals are, like ports, often devel-
oped and owned by the public sector and leased on contracts to private
operators. The procedure by which these relationships are formalised
thus provides a source of data analogous to the situation in ports and
therefore suitable for the research framework developed in this paper.
A total of ﬁve cases were analysed. The volumes handled vary from
20,000 TEU to 80,000 TEU annually. Regarding ownership, all case
sites are publicly owned, two by municipalities and three by the state-
owned company Jernhusen. Four of the ﬁve cases are registered as lim-
ited companies and one operates directly under the Trafﬁc and Property
Management Department of the municipality. Table 1 illustrates the
main characteristics of the ﬁve cases.
Two of the ﬁve cases were new-built terminals, hence they had no
previous terminal operator; however, the three terminals owned by
Jernhusen had the Swedish and Norwegian joint state-owned railroad
companyCargoNet asprevious operator. All three Jernhusen-owned ter-
minals ended up with new operators. As a result of acquisitions and
renewed tendering processes, many of the terminals have actually
changed operator since the original tendering processes. Currently, all
ﬁve terminals are operated by different terminal operators. The terminal
operators, with regard to the ﬁve cases, have been private since the ten-
dering processes were completed and the concession contracts signed.
All cases performed terminal tendering processes sometime during
the period 2009–2013. The normal tendering process was 3–6 months
from publishing the request for tender to signing the concession con-
tract. Themain empirical data consisted of the terminal concession con-
tracts, withmore detail provided and data gaps ﬁlled by interviewswith
the relevant stakeholders. For cases that are limited companies, second-
ary sources such as annual reports have also been useful sources of in-
formation and, for the case that is directly owned by the municipality,
additional informationwas obtained through the right-of-access princi-
ple in Sweden. The locations of the ﬁve cases have been kept anony-
mous for reasons of commercial conﬁdentiality.
An essential criterion of good case study research is to beware of sta-
tistical inference. The sample in this paper does not allow the drawing of
conclusions relating to the entire population. The goal of this paper is
exploratory, based on a representative sample, in order to draw outTable 1
The selection of cases and main characteristics.
Case Level of public
ownership
Ownership Legal body Traf
per
A Local Municipality Trafﬁc and Property Management
Department of the Municipality
~20
B Local Municipality Limited Company ~30
C National Jernhusen/ Government Limited Company ~30
D National Jernhusen/ Government Limited Company ~40
E National Jernhusen/ Government Limited Company ~60the issues. High or low coverage of a provision in the framework is not
proof that such an item is important or not important. Rather, it indi-
cates potential areas for future analysis with additional samples. Never-
theless, as this is the ﬁrst attempt to standardise intermodal terminal
concessions, such analysis is expected to provide a unique insight into
the process.
6. Background to the Swedish case
The Swedish intermodal terminal network started developingwhen
the state-owned rail operator SJ built some 40 terminals to facilitate the
start of intermodal trafﬁc (Bergqvist et al., 2010). The terminal network
was rationalised during the 1980s and 1990s and decreased to about 15
terminals. One explanation for the reduction in the number of terminals
was the increased focus on direct block trains, while the smaller termi-
nals did not have a sufﬁcient customer base to justify full block trains.
New operators also settled into the market and the potential for cross-
subsidisation between lines decreased.
During the 1990s new terminals started to be developed as a response
to the deregulation of the railwaymarket and the entrance of new rail op-
erators. One of the reasons for the development was that the new rail op-
erators had difﬁculty getting access to existing terminals since they were
controlled by the main state-owned rail operator and not open access.
The focus of the new operators was primarily on direct container shuttle
trains to and from the port of Gothenburg. Examples of these are Eskilstu-
na, Nässjö, Insjön, Falköping, Hallsberg, Åmal and Ahus (cf. Bergqvist &
Flodén, 2010). In some cases Swedish ports also developed intermodal
terminals within or adjacent to their sea-related terminals.
The Swedish government has had a somewhat passive role in the de-
velopment of intermodal terminals in the past. They have been more fo-
cused on ownership issues related to the state-owned rail operator,
infrastructure development and the deregulation process. A few
government-initiated investigations have beenmade focusing on the ter-
minal network with the purpose of identifying critical terminals with
special national interest froma transport systemperspective. The purpose
is to ensure that the Swedish Transport Administration considers
these carefully in their overall planning and investment strategies for
connecting infrastructure. As a result of further deregulation, the state-
owned intermodal terminals came under the ownership of the state-
owned company Jernhusen. During recent years, Jernhusen has been fo-
cusing on opening up the market for intermodal terminal operations. A
handful of terminals have undergone public tendering procedures and
attracted signiﬁcant interest from potential terminal operators.
7. Applying the framework
For ease of analysis, the 72 provisions have been divided into sec-
tions. The provisions have been analysed according to three perspec-
tives: whether the provision is necessary for intermodal terminals, to
what level of detail each provision is currently speciﬁed, and to what
level of detail each provision should be speciﬁed. The ﬁve intermodal
terminals, coded A to E, have been analysed in terms of the 72ﬁc volumes
annum
Type of trafﬁc Type of terminal
operator
Existing or
new-built
,000 TEU Containers Private New-built
,000 TEU Containers, semi-trailers and wagon load Private New-built
,000 TEU Containers Private Existing
,000 TEU Containers and semi-trailers Private Existing
,000 TEU Containers and semi-trailers Private Existing
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provision, each terminal has been coded either:
0 - provision is not included in the intermodal contract
1 - provision is included, but very simply
2 - provision is included in detail.
The overall level of representation of each provision across all ﬁve
terminals is then summarised as shown in Table 2.
Table 3 presents the results of the empirical analysis of mapping the
ﬁve intermodal terminal concession contracts against the port conces-
sion framework.
The ﬁrst striking aspect of the data is the high degree of commonal-
ity across the ﬁve cases, although, as noted earlier, caremust be taken in
drawing conclusions from this small sample. What can be seen is that,
overall, provision speciﬁcation for intermodal terminals is far less sub-
stantial compared to what is suggested in the port concession frame-
work, as shown in Table 4.
The table reveals that the only sectionwith comprehensive coverage
(majority of 2s) is the section on fees. The next sections with good cov-
erage (majority of 1s) are the introduction, hand over, project control
and ﬁnance and the legal sections. The weakest sections are extension
works (this may be partly because it is less relevant here), operations,
performance and hand back procedures. These represent major prob-
lems, because, as shown by Bergqvist & Monios (forthcoming), lack of
speciﬁcation of these provisions leads to many day-to-day operational
uncertainties. In order to resolve them, regular ongoing communication
is required between the public sector owner and the private sector
operator, leading to delays and increased costs.
Looking in detail at the sample contracts, it can be seen that many
concession contracts lack important information and speciﬁcations re-
garding priority to customers, open access deﬁnitions, division of roles
between infrastructure owner and terminal operator related to functions
such as marketing efforts. Other important gaps are which performance
standards and measures to use. Very few of the studied agreements
incorporated performance monitoring processes with deﬁned key per-
formance indicators. Furthermore, there are weak deﬁnitions and speci-
ﬁcations on the maintenance requirements for the terminal operator
related tomoveable assets, facilities and infrastructure. Another common
undeﬁned aspect is the operational subcontracting.
There are severe and critical gaps related to hand back procedures in
all of the studied contracts. There is uncertainty on which grounds the
contract can be terminated by the respective partner, termination com-
pensations, termination procedures (e.g. formal inspection of moveable
assets, facilities and infrastructure) and hand-back requirements.
Furthermore, options for continuation are rare and the deﬁnition of
ownership of assets is generallyweak aswell as asset transfers on expiry
or termination and transfer of employees. The contracts also lack a clear
framework for conﬂict resolutions which is particularly troublesome
given the many gaps identiﬁed in the contract.
A ﬁnal point is to look for any clauses that are not found in the port
concession framework, in order to explore if port concession contracts
are sufﬁcient for intermodal terminal operations or whether new provi-
sions should be added. None of the ﬁve cases studied for this paper in-
cluded any additional clauses. This will be a topic for further research.
Furthermore, as new concessions are made there is an opportunity forTable 2
Classiﬁcation system for each provision.
N/A This provision is not needed in an interm
Probably not relevant but could be This provision won't be relevant in most c
stay in the framework as it may be neede
Needed in future This provision is needed but most contrac
Acceptable This provision is needed and most contra
Should have more detail As above but this is an important provisio
Good This provision is needed and most contrafurther research by studying how these previsions are implemented
and their consequences.
Close analysis of the identiﬁed gaps reveals that they pose a severe
risk to terminal performance as they may hinder the efﬁcient operation
of the terminal and fail to resolve future situations that may arise over
the course of time, particularly conﬂicts of interest and uncertainties
over future liabilities. Several of the gaps can be explained by the lack
of experience on behalf of the public sector ofﬁcials managing the pro-
cess and the fact thatmany of the tenders are ﬁrst time terminal tender-
ing processes. Such uncertainty makes the terminal less attractive to
private sector operators who will therefore not be incentivised to bid
for the contract as theymay fear unexpected future costs and uncertain
proﬁt forecasts. In order to resolve these issues, a framework such as
that used in this paper could be utilised in future, with care taken to ad-
dress all relevant speciﬁcations in the required level of detail as listed in
8. Conclusions and research implications
The empirical analysis in this paper has used a selection of contracts
to reveal which provisions from the port reform toolkit are currently
speciﬁed in intermodal terminal concessions and to what degree. A
clear lack of sophistication has been identiﬁed in intermodal terminal
contracts compared to port concessions. While this may be due in part
to the reduced complexity and shorter timescales, such uncertainties
and discrepancies lead to inefﬁciency from a transport system perspec-
tive. Several implications for managerial practice as well as scholarly
knowledge can be identiﬁed.
8.1. Implications for managerial practice
Mucheffort goes into planning of freight infrastructure to achieve gov-
ernment policy aims of modal shift, and governments (and government-
backed infrastructure managers and rail ministries) strive to make track
access and other regulatory aspects of rail operations manageable and af-
fordable in order to induce private sector operators to enter themarket of
rail service provision. However, while intermodal terminal concession
contracts do not exhibit any universality of conditions, terminal operators
may not be able to offer handling services at consistently lowprices to the
rail operators, who in turn will be constrained in their ability to provide
regular reliable services to shippers and forwarders at prices competitive
with road haulage.When terminal users do not have conﬁdence of stable
and standard conditions across the network, potential service coverage
may be constrained as certain terminals are favoured. Very few of the
studied agreements incorporated performance monitoring processes
with deﬁned key performance indicators, which is an essential aspect
of port terminal concessions and one that frequently leads to legal dis-
putes when such terms are contended partway through a concession
timeframe. The result of this is that usage of intermodal transport may
be reduced, threatening the achievement of government modal shift
policy targets.
Successful intermodal transport was made possible not simply
by the invention or adoption of the container as a loading unit but by
their increasing standardization into a handful of dominant types
and sizes. As with equipment, so with operations; intermodal transport
is not a seamless journey from origin to destination but the joining
together of a number of discrete operations, several stakeholders,odal terminal concession contract.
ases and the contracts in the sample have mostly 0 s or 1 s, but it should probably
d in some cases.
ts currently don't have it (i.e. mostly 0 s).
cts currently have it speciﬁed at a simple level (i.e. mostly 1 s) but that is reasonable.
n and should be speciﬁed in detail (i.e. should be mostly 2 s).
cts currently have it speciﬁed at a detailed level (i.e. mostly 2 s).
Table 3
Port concession framework provisions coded by case.
No. Section No. Provision A B C D E Comments
1 Intro and basic
conditions
1 Introduction 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
2 Deﬁnitions 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
3 Conditions precedent 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
4 Grant of concession 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
5 Term of the agreement 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
2 Hand over 6 Employment 0 0 1 1 1 Acceptable
7 Transfer of assets 0 0 1 1 1 Acceptable
8 Hand-over of the terminal 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
9 Exclusivity 2 2 2 2 2 Good
3 Project control and
ﬁnance
10 Project 1 2 1 1 1 Acceptable
11 Project document compliance 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
12 Project ﬁnance 0 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
13 Lenders’ security 1 2 2 2 2 Good
4 Extension works 14 Functional requirements 1 2 1 1 1 Acceptable
15 Design solutions 1 2 1 1 1 Acceptable
16 Design developments 1 1 0 0 0 Acceptable
17 Design ﬂaws 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
18 Applicable permits 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
19 Concession area conditions 2 2 2 2 2 Good
20 Archaeological or geological items 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
21 Building contract 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
22 Construction program 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
23 Progress reviews 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
24 Extension events 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
25 Sanctions for late completion 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
26 Commissioning of the project phases 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
5 Operations 27 Operator’s operational functions and activities 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
28 Port authority’s port services 0 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
29 Berthing priorities 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
30 Security 0 1 0 0 0 Needed in future
31 Use of the terminals 1 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
32 Operator’s operational performance standards 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
33 Maintenance of moveable assets, facilities and infrastructure 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
34 Operational subcontracting 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
6 Fees 35 Tariff regulation (by port authority) 2 2 2 2 2 Good
36 Tariff setting (by terminal operator) 2 2 2 2 2 Good
37 Site lease (e.g. ﬂat fee or per m2, inﬂation, etc.) 1 2 2 2 2 Good
38 TEU fee (optional, may also specify min. throughput) 2 2 2 2 2 Good
39 Bank guarantee 0 1 2 2 2 Good
40 Reﬁnancing needing approval of port authority 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
41 Release from rents, taxes, levies and other obligations and dues 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
42 Payments to the government 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
7 Legal and insurance 43 Information supply to port authority (e.g. throughput, etc.) 1 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
44 Legal compliance 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
45 Change in future law (e.g. tax increases) 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
46 Force majeure (what events beyond the operator’s control will
affect their performance )
1 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
47 Insurance 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
8 Hand back 48 Ownership of assets 1 2 2 2 2 Good
49 Option to continue 2 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
50 (Interim) termination by the government 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
51 Termination by the operator 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
52 Termination procedure 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
53 Rights cease 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
54 Termination compensation 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
55 Hand-back 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
56 Asset transfers on expiry or termination 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
57 Information technology license 0 0 0 0 0 Probably not relevant but could be
58 No share or liability acquisition (cases where the port authority
owns a share of the operator)
0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
59 Transfer of employees 0 0 0 0 0 Probably not relevant but could be
60 Conﬂict resolution 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
9 Legal and insurance 61 Waiver of immunity 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
62 Recognition of lenders’ rights 1 1 1 1 1 Probably not relevant but could be
10 Performance 63 Performance monitoring 0 1 1 1 1 Should have more detail
64 Transfer committee 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
65 Responsibilities (including actions of sub-contractors) 0 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
66 Liabilities (limited to losses relating to breaches of contract) 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
11 Legal and insurance 67 Conﬁdentiality 0 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
68 Disclosed data 0 0 0 0 0 Probably not relevant but could be
69 Change in institutional structures 0 0 0 0 0 Needed in future
70 Variations 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
71 Applicable law 1 1 1 1 1 Acceptable
72 Notices 0 0 1 1 1 Acceptable
Note: 0 (provision is not included), 1 (provision is included but very simply), 2 (provision is included in detail).
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Table 4
Summary of provision speciﬁcation by category.
No. Section No. of provisions Coverage
1 Intro and basic conditions 5 All provisions are covered, but only in basic terms.
2 Hand over 4 All provisions are covered, but only in basic terms, except for exclusivity, which received detailed coverage in all ﬁve cases.
This is acceptable as it is the hand back that needs more detailed speciﬁcation.
3 Project control and ﬁnance 4 All provisions are covered, but only in basic terms. This is acceptable as this is a fairly straightforward topic.
4 Extension works 13 Good coverage of 5 out of 13. It is difﬁcult to comment further on this section as it is very case speciﬁc. It would require more
detailed qualitative analysis of individual cases.
5 Operations 8 Good coverage of 4 provisions but no coverage of 4. This is an area of concern.
6 Fees 8 High coverage of 5 provisions, no coverage of 3 which are not needed. This is a good result.
7 Legal and insurance 5 Good coverage of 4 out of 5 but more detail is needed on these important provisions.
8 Hand back 13 6 well covered and 7 not covered. This is a concern as this is a very contentious topic.
9 Legal and insurance 2 Coverage of 1 but not the other. This is not so important.
10 Performance 4 Coverage of 2 out of 4. This is a concern as these provisions need detailed speciﬁcation.
11 Legal and insurance 6 Coverage of 4 out of 6. This is acceptable but could be improved.
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ing standardisation has been essential to the development of intermod-
al transport, not only in the physical standards of containers and
handling apparatus, but in domestic and international regulation, in
business practice and information sharing, and in supply chain integra-
tion through mergers and acquisitions. One important element of the
above is the management and operation of intermodal terminals.
Likewise, the rise in port efﬁciency in recent decades has resulted not
solely from standardisation of equipment (e.g. container types, handling
equipment, cellular holds in container vessels) but changes in manage-
ment structure and the harnessing of private sector investment. It is not
yet clear if such advantages have been fully exploited in the intermodal
sector; application of a standardised framework can, therefore, enable
identiﬁcation of sources of inefﬁciency that need to be addressed
through better tendering procedures.
The particular cases analysed in this paper show severe shortages in
crucial areas of terminal concession agreements relating to operations,
performancemonitoring and hand back procedures. The limited sample
size in this studymeans that caremust be taken extrapolating results to
the wider population of terminals in Sweden, Europe and further aﬁeld.
Future research is required to determine if the ﬁndings in the Swedish
case are reﬂected in other geographical contexts. The aim of this
paper, however, was to use Sweden as a test case for this methodology
and to establish the groundwork for a framework that can be applied to
all terminals. As seen in the port sector, a standardised framework could
be of great use to public sector administrators managing the concession
process, who do not always possess the required industry knowledge to
specify such provisions with conﬁdence. It would also enable private
sector operators to enter the market with greater certainty and less
risk, which is also the aim of public sector terminal developers. The re-
search has shown that the port concession framework can be applied
successfully to intermodal terminals, and the framework facilitates
identiﬁcation and comparison of deﬁciencies. Such analysis can be use-
ful both to public sector managers seeking the best concession for their
terminal, as well as private sector terminal operators seeking the most
appropriate and proﬁtable location to enter the market in a particular
country or region.8.2. Contribution to scholarly knowledge
Such a framework is also of use to researchers. The intermodal
literature tends to focus either on the development process or the
operational phase, with less attention given to the link between the
two, i.e. how the developer ﬁnds an operator and secures both efﬁcient
operations and acceptable prices for users. The ﬁndings from this paper
suggest that this process is quite uncertain andmay be exerting consid-
erable limitations on the quality of the intermodal network. A solution
to this problem should therefore be a signiﬁcant priority for public sec-
tor network managers, and requires analysis of further cases to identifybest practice that can be included in the framework. Another topic for
further research is whether any additional provisions should be added
to those examined in the current port concession framework, as well
as changes over time when a terminal goes through successive conces-
sion processes.
This research is exploratory, thus this paper provides the ﬁrst step in
addressing this topic and introducing a degree of standardisation. Now
that a framework has been developed in this paper, future research is
needed to apply the ﬁndings in other contexts in order to reﬁne the
framework further. Such research can identify if there are differences
between countries, and to what degree processes of standardisation
have been implemented and how successful they have been, with a
view eventually to develop a global standard such as that used in the
port sector.
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